SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more

interestingchanges in significant areas of practice.
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LAW-FREEDOM

To ENJOIN

OF SPEECH-TRIAL COURTS

PROTESTORS AT ABORTION CLINICS

WHERE TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS ARE NARROWLY TAILORED-Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J.

126, 638 A.2d 1260 (1994).
In August of 1990, the Helpers of God's Precious Infants
(Helpers), led by defendant AnthonyJ. Felicissimo, started holding
Saturday prayer vigils across the street from plaintiff Horizon
Health Center (Center), a family-planning clinic in Jersey City,
NewJersey. 135 N.J. 126, 132, 638 A.2d 1260, 1263. On Saturdays,
the Center performed abortions and administered various prenatal
tests for women in their third trimester of pregnancy.
A few months later, the Helpers began protesting on the sidewalk in front of the Center and approaching women who were entering the Center in an effort to "counsel" them. Such sidewalk
counseling included showing the women photographs depicting
bloody, dismembered fetuses and stating to the potential patients
that the Center was filled with murderers who "tear the arms and
legs off your babies." Jersey City police officers occasionally warned
the demonstrators not to block access to the Center.
On Saturday, October 19, 1991, the Helpers staged a large
demonstration in front of the Center, requiring the Jersey City Police Department to close one lane of the street on which the
Center was located. -Id. at 133-34, 638 A.2d at 1263. The demonstrators used a microphone and speaker to chant, break into song,
and recite the rosary. The noise was so extensive that patients and
Center personnel in the interior areas of the building could hear
it, even after increasing the volume on television sets and radios.
Because of the demonstration, twenty-five of the scheduled fortyfive women who were to have abortions did not show up at the
clinic, nor did one patient in need of emergency diabetes testing.
On the morning of the demonstration, the director of the
Center filed a complaint seeking an injunction of the protestors'
activities. Id. at 134, 638 A.2d at 1263. After an emergent ex parte
hearing, the chancery division granted a temporary restraining order that restricted all demonstration activities conducted by the
Helpers to the opposite side of the street from the Center. Id., 638
A.2d at 1264. The order also provided that the demonstrators were
not to disrupt the operations of the Center or interfere with traffic
entering or exiting the clinic. Id.
After a full hearing later in the month, the trial court issued a
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letter opinion which found that the protestors had harassed patients and prevented them from entering onto the premises of the
Center. Id. at 135, 638 A.2d at 1264. This, the trial court maintained, acted to interfere with the right of patients to receive
health care and their privacy right to abortion. Id. In issuing a
permanent injunction, the trial court prohibited the demonstrators from occupying the sidewalk in front of the Center. Id. at 13536, 638 A.2d at 1264-65.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, upheld
the permanent injunction against defendants' free speech challenge. Id. at 136, 638 A.2d at 1265. Finding that the injunction was
not content-based, the appellate division stated that the injunction's time, place, and manner restrictions were reasonable in that
they were narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest in
protecting both the Center's property and patients' access to
health services. Id. Additionally, the appellate division held that
the injunction left the defendants with several alternative channels
of communication. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for certification. Id. (citation omitted). The court held that
while the trial court had the authority to grant the injunction, the
judgment should be modified to narrowly tailor the "manner" restrictions. Id. at 131, 154, 638 A.2d at 1262, 1274. Additionally, the
court remanded the matter to the chancery division to reconsider
the "place" restrictions. Id.
Justice Clifford, writing for a unanimous court, began the discussion by noting that a court of equity has the authority to grant
injunctive relief barring nonviolent, noncriminal activity. Id. at
137, 638 A.2d at 1265 (citations omitted). Additionally, the justice
noted that a court has the power to limit public speech if the time,
place, and manner restrictions are content-neutral. Id. After reaffirming the trial court's right to grant injunctive relief, the court
acknowledged that the injunction at issue regulates expression that
is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 138-39, 638 A.2d at
1265-66. Justice Clifford noted that the expression is not removed
from the protection of the First Amendment even though some of
the patients might be offended by or disagree with the message
espoused by the Helpers. Id. at 139, 638 A.2d at 1266.
The court, in discussing the level of scrutiny to apply to the
injunction, determined that because the protests in this instance
took place on a public street, they clearly took place in a public
forum. Id. at 140, 638 A.2d at 1266-67. Justice Clifford then stated
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that the next determination to be made was whether the restrictions contained in the injunction were content-neutral or contentbased. Id., 638 A.2d at 1267. The justice propounded that the appropriate inquiry was whether the government regulated the
speech because of a disagreement with the conveyed message. Id.
at 140-41, 638 A.2d at 1267 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The court stated that a time, place, and
manner restriction is reasonable in a public forum only if it is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to meet a significant government interest, and leaves alternative channels of communication available.
Id. at 140, 638 A.2d at 1267 (citing Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
Addressing the content-neutrality of the injunction, Justice
Clifford acknowledged the defendants' argument that the injunction was based on the content of the message because it applied
only to those named therein and those acting in concert with
them. Id. at 141, 638 A.2d at 1267. After surveying cases from various jurisdictions where courts dealt with similar injunctions restricting the speech of only anti-abortion protestors, the court
concluded that the injunction at issue was content-neutral. Id. at
141-42, 638 A.2d at 1267-68. In so holding, the court disagreed
with a recent Eleventh Circuit decision which held that an injunction was content-based because it happened to restrict one particular group, i.e., pro-lifers. Id. at 143, 638 A.2d at 1268 (citing Cheffer
v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993)). The justice explained
that the trial court did not purposefully suppress anti-abortion
messages, evidenced primarily by the fact that the injunction made
no mention of the content of the protestors' speech. Id. at 142,
638 A.2d at 1268. Justice Clifford emphasized that the trial court
found that the demonstrators had interfered with traffic and the
access of potential patients into the facility. Id. at 142-43, 638 A.2d
at 1268. Additionally, the court maintained that the protestors
could still espouse their message as long as it did not disrupt the
functioning of the Center or its staff and patients. Id. at 143, 638
A.2d at 1268.
Justice Clifford next addressed the significant governmental
interest served by the injunction. Id., 638 A.2d at 1268. Thejustice
agreed with the trial court's finding that accessibility of medical
services, public safety, and protection of private property were significant governmental interests. Id. at 143-44, 638 A.2d at 1268. In
examining the issue of accessibility of medical services, which includes abortion and the maintenance of medical standards, the
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court declined to decide the case using a privacy rationale. Id. at
144, 638 A.2d at 1269. Although the court admitted that New
Jersey's Constitution was silent as to a fundamental right to health,
the court recognized the priority afforded by the State to the preservation of health. Id. Justice Clifford determined that this was
enough to justify injunctions that may collaterally affect the constitutional rights of some citizens. Id. at 145, 638 A.2d at 1269.
Furthermore, the court opined that the State has an interest
in assuring that an abortion is performed under circumstances that
will provide the patient with maximum safety. Id. (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)). The court maintained that even
those seeking prenatal testing or other services offered by the
Center were entitled to unrestricted access. Id. at 146, 638 A.2d at
1269. To support this viewpoint, the court cited a recent amendment to New York's administrative code dealing with disruptions
and picketing at reproductive health-care service centers. Id., 638
A.2d at 1269-70 (citation omitted). The court reiterated that because the raucous noise made by the demonstrators at the Center
detrimentally affected the government's interest in assuring the
safety of medical procedures, injunctive relief was properly issued
by the trial court. Id., 638 A.2d at 1270. In addition, Justice Clifford concluded that the protestors interfered with the government's right to protect private property and public safety. Id. at
146-47, 638 A.2d at 1270.
Next, the justice examined whether the injunction issued by
the trial court was narrowly tailored to achieve the government's
objective. Id. at 147-48, 638 A.2d at 1270-71. Justice Clifford explained that a narrowly tailored remedy must be targeted at and
eliminate only the exact source of the problem it seeks to redress.
Id., 638 A.2d at 1270 (quotation omitted). Because of the nature
of an injunction, the court stated, it will usually be more narrow
than a general regulation; the court noted, however, that not every
injunction is narrowly tailored simply because it lists specific terms
and limits its application to certain parties. Id. at 148, 638 A.2d at
1270-71.
In examining the manner restrictions in the injunction, the
court stated that because an injunction should be molded to preserve the health and safety of women seeking medical procedures,
it should focus more clearly on the problem caused by the volume
of the protesting. Id. at 149-50, 638 A.2d at 1271-72. The justice,
therefore, modified the trial court's injunction to prohibit defendants from screaming, yelling, or otherwise making noise so loud as
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to interfere with the administration of medical services in the
Center. Id. This, Justice Clifford maintained, would be aimed in a
more direct fashion at the harm caused, thus balancing the defendants' First Amendment rights with the significant governmental interests. Id. at 150, 638 A.2d at 1272.
Furthermore, in addressing the place restrictions imposed by
the trial court, the court noted that the injunction prohibited the
defendants from trespassing on or invading the Center's property.
Id. Justice Clifford stated that the injunction also banned the Helpers from interfering with the ingress and egress of traffic to and
from the Center. Id. The court agreed with the holdings of courts
in other jurisdictions analyzing similar injunction provisions that
these restrictions were narrowly tailored in such a way as to serve
significant governmental interests. Id. at 150-51, 638 A.2d at 1272.
The problem with the restrictions at issue, Justice Clifford proffered, is whether limiting the demonstrators to the sidewalk opposite the Center is narrowly tailored as well. Id. Although the court
recognized that other courts have affirmed the creation of "speechfree" zones in certain circumstances, it maintained that the buffer
created around the Center was too broad. Id. The court distinguished several of the other decisions by explaining that those
cases involved a history of violence by protestors. Id. at 151-52, 638
A.2d at 1272-73 (citations omitted). Even in those cases, Justice
Clifford stated, the restrictions were more narrow than the one
contained herein. Id. at 151, 638 A.2d at 1272. The court maintained that because there had been no assaults or threats against
Center personnel or patients, the injunction should have been
crafted to allow a limited form of expression in proximity to the
Center's entrance and restrict only the more troublesome protestors to the opposite side of the street. Id. at 152, 638 A.2d at 1273.
The court maintained, however, that because the crafting of
such an order is fact-sensitive, a remand to the trial court would be
appropriate because it was more familiar with the participants and
the location involved in the matter. Id. at 152-53, 638 A.2d at 1273.
In addition, Justice Clifford admitted, the trial court would be better equipped to determine exactly what type of limited expression
should be allowed directly in front of the Center. Id.
As a final element of the time, place, and manner analysis,
Justice Clifford concluded that adequate alternative channels of
communication would exist after the modification of the injunction. Id. at 153, 638 A.2d at 1273. The court explained that the
protestors' restricted access to the front of the Center would allow
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for some expression near the Center's entrance. Id. The court
stated that the Helpers would still be able to address patients, staff,
and others in a civil manner, as well as continue their practices of
praying and carrying placards across the street from the Center.
Id.
Finally, the court declined to invoke the free speech provisions
of the New Jersey Constitution, reasoning that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provided adequate protection to the defendants. Id. at 154, 638 A.2d at 1273-74. Justice
Clifford noted that the court historically analyzed free speech challenges under the principles of the United States Constitution. Id.
The court, therefore, modified and affirmed the judgment of the
appellate division and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id., 638 A.2d at 1274.
The court's well-reasoned conclusion in this case not only provides a concise summary of the analytical framework to be used in
considering time, place, and manner restrictions in a constitutional challenge of the infringement of First Amendment rights,
but it also recognizes a strong governmental interest in protecting
a woman's right to seek medical care. Not quite a landmark decision, it is nonetheless one supported by fairly general principles of
First Amendment scholarship and federal decisions addressing similar injunctions in similar circumstances. The court correctly held
that a woman has a right to safe health care, free from interference. Although protestors may argue that their demonstrations
will now be less effective as a result of more restrictive injunctions
in similar circumstances, the point remains that the Helpers and
other similar groups will still have channels of communication
available at abortion centers and other clinics. While many peaceful demonstrations do take place, the specter of violence against
abortion doctors and patients remains. This decision will at least
help to serve as a buffer to the potential for that kind of violence in
New Jersey.
Louis A. Chiafullo
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PUBLIC WEL-

UNDER GENERAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAw

TERMINATING THE PROVISION

OF TEMPORARY RENTAL ASSIST-

ANCE AFTER ONE YEAR VIOLATES THE PROGRAM'S PURPOSE TO

T. v.
New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., 134 N.J. 304, 633 A.2d 964
(1993).
PROVIDE TEMPORARY HOUSING TO PERSONS IN NEED-L.

In L. T. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, the petitioners, five Paterson residents, each received benefits under the state's
General Public Assistance Law (GPAL) from the Paterson Municipal Welfare Agency (PMWA). Id. at 307-08, 633 A.2d at 966. Temporary rental assistance (TRA) was granted to each of the five in
order to prevent them from becoming homeless. Id. at 308, 633
A.2d at 966. While receiving benefits in the form of TRA, each
petitioner took part in the GPAL's employment program. This
program required the petitioners to seek employment, disability
benefits, affordable housing, and other assistance. Unfortunately,
all five were unsuccessful in their efforts. After the petitioners had
received TRA benefits for a period of at least twelve months, the
PMWA attempted to terminate their benefits on the grounds that
the regulations of the Department of Human Services (DHS) restrict the duration of TRA benefits to a period of one year.
Municipal welfare departments administer the GPAL program
in accordance with the directives and regulations set forth by DHS.
Id. at 310, 633 A.2d at 967. The regulations include a variety of
services and benefits designed to aid homeless persons. Among
these services is the emergency assistance program that places
homeless persons in motels. Id. at 310, 633 A.2d at 967. This
emergency assistance program also encompasses the TRA program
that permits qualifying GPAL recipients to receive rental subsidies
for a period up to one year. Id. at 310-11, 633 A.2d at 968.
While the Commissioner of Human Services contended that
the regulations do not permit TRA benefits to extend beyond the
one year limit, DHS had granted discretionary extensions of benefits under TRA. Id. at 311, 633 A.2d at 968. In fact, each petitioner
was granted such an extension, but DHS eventually made final decisions in each case to terminate the petitioners' TRA benefits. Id.
Petitioners appealed the DHS ruling to the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division. Id.
On appeal, the appellate division held that the petitioners'
rights to TRA had been exhausted, and thus affirmed the findings
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of the DHS. Id. The appellate division asserted that the shelter
scheme questioned by the petitioners had been evaluated by the
Commissioner and had also been given approval by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Id. (citing Williams v. New Jersey Dep't of Human
Serv., 116 N.J. 102, 561 A.2d 244 (1989) [hereinafter Williams I];
Williams v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., 121 N.J. 667, 583 A.2d
351 (1990) [hereinafter Williams III]). Also, in rejecting the petitioners' contention that DHS's own regulations entitled them to
receive continued TRA rent subsidies, the court noted that the particular regulation was confined to the extension of emergency
assistance placement in motels and did not extend to TRA benefits.
Id. Finally, the appellate division found that DHS's refusal to grant
the petitioners further extensions of benefits under TRA did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. (citation omitted).
The NewJersey Supreme Court granted the petitions for certification. Id. at 312, 633 A.2d at 968. Reversing, the supreme court
unanimously held that the regulation terminating TRA benefits after one year without a fall-back provision to provide shelter conflicted with the intent of the legislature that the administration of
the GPAL program provide temporary shelter for those citizens
who are facing homelessness. Id. at 325, 633 A.2d at 975. The
court then directed DHS to continue providing TRA benefits to
present and future claimants facing homelessness unless the individual claimant did not cooperate with an individual plan of action
to remedy homelessness, or unless another government agency was
designated to provide last-resort shelter. Id. Justice O'Hern, writing for a unanimous court, first examined the New Jersey Supreme
Court's previous decisions concerning the GPAL. Id. at 312-20, 633
A.2d at 968-73.
The justice considered the findings of the NewJersey Supreme
Court under Williams I, in which it reviewed three categories of
relief under the GPAL, one of which is the emergency assistance
program. Id. at 312, 633 A.2d at 968 (citation omitted). In Williams I, Justice O'Hern recalled, the court held that diligent efforts
to help recipients off of the emergency assistance program were
necessary because of the program's extraordinary expense. Id. at
313, 633 A.2d at 969. The justice further recollected that the Williams I court also concluded that the legislature did not intend for
the program to be administered in a way that would result in the
very homelessness that the program was designed to prevent. Id.
Justice O'Hern went on to explain that, in response to the
concerns raised by the court's decision in Williams I, DHS took ac-
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tion designed to ensure that emergency assistance claimants would
find temporary shelter and hopefully permanent housing. Id. at
314, 633 A.2d at 969. Eventually, the justice continued, regulations
that included the twelve-month TRA program at issue in this case
were adopted after approval by the supreme court in Williams III.
Id. at 315-16, 633 A.2d at 970 (citing Williams III, 121 N.J. at 668,
583 A.2d at 351 (1990)) (other citations omitted). The court further noted that the regulations also require "individualized plan [s]
of action" aimed at helping emergency assistance recipients find
permanent housing. Id. at 317, 633 A.2d at 971. Such plans are
advantageous, the court stated, because supplemental benefits for
which recipients may be unknowingly eligible, such as food stamps
and Social Security disability benefits, may enable them to find
housing on their own. Id.
Justice O'Hem maintained that the regulations contemplate
"more than mere formalism" in creating these individualized plans
of action. Id. Rather, the justice posited, the regulations contemplate that a counselor will carefully examine each recipient's individual needs, create an individual plan to change the
circumstances that resulted in each recipient's homelessness, and
help each recipient through the bureaucratic labyrinths of other
programs. Id. In this case, the court concluded, some of the petitioners' plans were "little more than an exercise in formalism." Id.
Next, the court noted the Commissioner's insistence that he
lacked the authority to extend the petitioners' benefits, regardless
of the inadequacy of their individualized plans of action, because
of TRA's one-year expiration period. Id. at 319, 633 A.2d at 972.
The court conceded that the regulation, on its face, did not authorize extensions of TRA beyond the one-year limit, and concluded that it must address the question of whether the one-year
limitation upon TRA benefits was a valid exercise of DHS's authority. Id. at 320, 633 A.2d at 972-73.
In addressing the issue of agency authority, Justice O'Hern
first acknowledged that in reviewing agency action, courts may act
only in the rare situation where the action and its legislative mandate are clearly inconsistent. Id., 633 A.2d at 973. A court is not
permitted to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, the
justice continued, unless the action is arbitrary, unreasonable, or
not statutorily authorized. Id. (citation omitted). The court then
asserted that its inquiry would be limited to the issue of whether
the regulation in question violated the express or implied legislative policy of the enabling act. Id. at 321, 633 A.2d at 973.
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The court maintained that the GPAL program was designed to
provide, as a last resort, shelter to needy New Jersey residents. Id.
at 323, 633 A.2d at 974. Reminding that the TRA program was
conceived to furnish GPAL recipients with temporary shelter, the
court pointed out that the program also contemplates that administrators at the local level will make active efforts to help recipients
help themselves by finding them employment or securing for them
disability benefits. Id. Justice O'Hern conceded that an expiration
period is necessary for a program like TRA, but asserted that such
an expiration period merely serves to check bureaucratic inefficiency. Id. The legislature, the justice posited, did not anticipate
that recipients who have made diligent efforts to resolve their circumstances should be returned to the streets at the end of the year.
Id.
In addressing the issue of legislative intent concerning the
GPAL, the court opined that both the executive and legislative
branches intended that the homeless citizens of NewJersey have "a
place to go where they must take you in." Id. at 323-24, 633 A.2d at
974 (quoting Williams I, 116 N.J. at 124, 561 A.2d at 255-56). Justice O'Hern lamented that "homelessness represents something
uniquely devastating to the human spirit," and concluded that the
legislature did not intend for the GPAL to result in the homelessness of those persons to whose needs the legislation was addressed.
Id. at 324, 633 A.2d at 974-75. When our society is no longer able
to shelter the homeless, the justice advanced, then the legislature
will certainly make that clear. Id. at 325, 633 A.2d at 975.
Finally, the court concluded that the legislature's intention
concerning the GPAL program was that it be administered in a
manner that provides our neediest citizens with temporary shelter.
Id. Thus, the supreme court held, the regulation terminating TRA
rental subsidies in a manner that results in the homelessness of
recipients conflicts with the legislative purpose behind the GPAL.
Id.
Homelessness is a societal problem that is marked by unthinkable human misery and suffering. Legislation such as the GPAL
recognizes that homelessness is often the result of unfortunate circumstances that are beyond the control of the individual. This legislation also represents, for many people, a last resort that literally
keeps them from living on the streets. For these reasons, it is extremely important that the GPAL be administered in a manner
that takes the special needs and circumstances of homeless people
into account. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in L. T.
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will serve to avert homelessness and ensure that all efforts will be
made to help GPAL recipients find permanent housing on their
own.
The court's holding in L.T. reflects careful consideration of
the purpose and intent of the GPAL, which is to provide homeless
persons with shelter of last resort. Certainly, an arbitrary and absolute cut-off date for rental subsidies that does not consider a recipient's circumstances or efforts to end her homelessness would result
only in the homelessness of those persons that the statute was enacted to protect. This result is not only ironic, it is tragic. The L. T.
court's decision assures that GPAL recipients will not find themselves on the streets if their efforts to secure permanent shelter
have been unsuccessful.
Furthermore, the court has given DHS an incentive to administer the emergency assistance program in such a way that GPAL
recipients will be given the assistance they need in finding employment and securing other benefits that may be available to them.
Because DHS may no longer terminate TRA benefits after one
year, there will be a greater need to focus on the individual plans
of action aimed at helping homeless persons resolve the circumstances that have resulted in their homelessness. Thus, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in L.T. leads to a most fortunate
result: The GPAL will be administered in a manner that envisions
a permanent end, rather than a temporary solution, to the homelessness of its recipients.
Dione Marie Enea

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SENATORIAL COURTESY-SENATORIAL
COURTESY MAY BE USED TO BLOCK THE CONFIRMATION OF A GuBERNATORIAL NOMINATION-De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 634

A.2d 493 (1993).
Judge Marianne Espinosa Murphy, appellant, was nominated
to the Superior Court of New Jersey by Governor Thomas Kean in
July 1986. 134 N.J. at 423, 634 A.2d at 495. Governor Kean, with
the advice and consent of the New Jersey Senate, appointed Judge
Murphy to the court on September 11, 1986. GovernorJim Florio,
in anticipation of the expiration of Judge Murphy's initial seven
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year term, renominated her in May 1993. Id. at 424, 634 A.2d at
495.
Senator John Dorsey, however, invoked the unwritten procedure of senatorial courtesy to block Judge Murphy's reappointment to the bench. Subsequent to Senator Dorsey's invocation of
senatorial courtesy, Senator Raymond Lesniak proposed a resolution which, if adopted, would have compelled the Senate Judiciary
Committee to consider Judge Murphy's renomination. Id. at 42425, 634 A.2d at 495. The Senate rejected the resolution by a 12-22
vote. Id. at 425, 634 A.2d 496. The Senate took no further action
on Judge Murphy's renomination following the resolution's defeat.
Judge Murphy's appointment expired on September 11, 1993.
On August 27, 1993,just prior to the expiration ofJudge Murphy's appointment, plaintiffs filed suit in the New Jersey Superior
Court, Chancery Division seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. Among the relief sought, plaintiffs requested that the court declare the practice of senatorial courtesy unconstitutional under the
New Jersey Constitution. Id. The New Jersey Constitution states:
"The Governor shall nominate and appoint, with the advice and
consent of the Senate... the Judges of the Superior Court." Id. at
423, 634 A.2d at 495 (citing N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6,
1).
The chancery division, however, dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the case presented a non-justiciable issue. Id.
at 426, 634 A.2d at 496. The court ruled that the New Jersey Constitution delegated the power of judicial confirmation to the Senate. Id. As such, the court decided, there was no standard by
which the judiciary may determine whether the exercise of senatorial courtesy is an abuse of that power. Id. Nevertheless, the court
went on to find that senatorial courtesy was a valid exercise of the
confirmation power under the New Jersey Constitution's Advice
and Consent Clause. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
direct certification, and heard oral argument on September 8,
1993. Id. (citing 134 N.J. 166, 634 A.2d 517 (1993)). The court
unanimously upheld the ruling of the trial court, in effect denying
Judge Murphy tenure, but was evenly divided over the reasoning.
Id. at 465, 634 A.2d at 515.
Justice Pollock, joined by Justices Clifford and Garibaldi, initially described the process of senatorial courtesy with regard to
judicial nominations. Id. at 426, 634 A.2d at 496 (Pollock, J., concurring). Senatorial courtesy, the justice instructed, allows a single
senator from the judicial nominee's county to block Senate action
on the nomination without regard to the merits of the nomination,
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without disclosing the reasons for vetoing the appointment, and
without holding any hearings on the matter. Id. at 427, 634 A.2d at
497 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice conceded that the practice is not codified in any rule. Id. at 426, 634 A.2d at 496 (Pollock,
J., concurring).
Justice Pollock next had to determine whether the court
should refrain from deciding the case because the issue had been
rendered moot by the Senate's failure to confirm Judge Murphy's
appointment. Id. at 428, 634 A.2d at 497 (Pollock, J., concurring).
The justice pointed out that the New Jersey Constitution does not
prevent the court from deciding a moot issue. Id. (citing N.J.
CONST. art. VI, § 1,
1). Thejustice noted, however, that the court
will decide a moot issue only when that issue is of significant public
importance and is likely to occur again. Id. (citing In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 342, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)).
In the instant case, the concurrence determined that the court
should decide the appeal because senatorial courtesy was an issue
of "extraordinary public concern." Id. at 429, 634 A.2d at 497 (Pollock, J., concurring). Senatorial courtesy, the court found, implicated fundamental questions concerning the separate powers of
each branch of government over judicial appointments. Id. Moreover, the justice continued, invocation of the procedure may recur.
Id., 634 A.2d at 498. (Pollock, J., concurring).
Justice Pollock then focused on the question of whether the
constitutionality of senatorial courtesy was ajusticiable issue which
the court could decide. Id. The justice explained that if the action
was capable of review the court could decide the merits of the case.
Id. The justice articulated, however, that if the issue was within the
Senate's realm of constitutional power, then the court had to dismiss the case. Id. The concurrence concluded that the complaint
posed a non-justiciable political question and dismissed the case.
Id.
The court initially set forth the basic test for determining the
justiciability of a political question. Id. at 430, 634 A.2d at 498 (Pollock, J., concurring). The court, the justice instructed, will consider the following factors when deciding an issue's justiciability:
(1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"; (2) "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) "the
impossibility of deciding [the issue] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution [of the
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issue] without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government"; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made"; and (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question." Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Justice Pollock found that the New Jersey Constitution textually committed the confirmation of judicial nominees to the Senate. Id. The constitution, the justice expounded, specifically
provides the Senate with the power of advice and consent with regard to gubernatorial appointments. Id. Additionally, the concurrence observed, the constitution did not provide a role for the
judiciary in that process. Id. Thus, Justice Pollock declared, the
court could not decide how the Senate should implement its constitutional power to approve judicial appointments. Id.
In so finding, Justice Pollock emphasized that there were no
standards by which the court could judge the Senate's action. Id.
at 432, 634 A.2d at 499 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice explained that the term "advice and consent" had no definition and
that the constitution does not provide for how the Senate is to exercise this power. Id. Additionally, the justice argued, contrary to
Justice Handler's interpretation, the constitution's requirement
that the "Senate" confirm nominations does not necessarily connote that collective action by the entire legislative body is required.
Id. at 433, 634 A.2d at 499 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock
pointed out that the constitution does not compel the Senate to act
on any gubernatorial nomination. Id., 634 A.2d at 500 (Pollock, J.,
concurring). The constitution, the justice noted, merely contemplates that a judicial nomination will not proceed without Senate
approval. Id. Consequently, the justice found that there were no
manageable standards by which the court could review the Senate's
action. Id. at 432, 634 A.2d at 499 (Pollock, J., concurring). Accordingly, the concurrence concluded that a textual reading of the
constitution prevented the court from ordering the Senate to confirm Judge Murphy's nomination. Id. at 433, 634 A.2d at 500 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Justice Pollock, however, did not foreclose all judicial review of
the Senate's use of senatorial courtesy. Id. at 439, 634 A.2d at 503
(Pollock, J., concurring). The justice warned that if a nominee's
fundamental rights were violated through the use of senatorial
courtesy, then the court could review the action. Id. at 440, 634
A.2d at 503 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice stated that "even
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an internal Senate practice is subject to judicial review if that practice results in the violation of fundamental rights." Id. at 441, 634
A.2d at 504 (Pollock, J., concurring). Hence, the concurrence illustrated, if the Senate decided a judicial nomination on the basis
of a coin toss, the court could review that action. Id. at 440, 634
A.2d at 503 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock concluded by
remarking that non-tenured judges do not have an unqualified
right to reappointment. Id. at 441, 634 A.2d at 504 (Pollock, J.,
concurring).
Justice Handler, joined by Justices O'Hern and Stein, agreed
with the court's decision to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 444,
634 A.2d at 505 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). The justice, however, disputed Justice Pollock's finding that
the case presented a non-justiciable political question. Id. Reaching the merits of the complaint, Justice Handler maintained that
senatorial courtesy is unconstitutional when a gubernatorial nomination is rejected before the entire Senate acts. Id. at 443, 634 A.2d
at 505 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the
within matter, the justice continued, there was not a constitutional
violation because the Senate acted in a collective fashion when it
rejected Judge Murphy's renomination. Id. at 444, 634 A.2d at 505
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Handler initially addressed the justiciability issue and
found the case to be one the court could decide. Id. Considering
the Baker factors cited by the concurrence, the justice conceded
that the constitution provides the Senate with confirmation power
over gubernatorial nominations. Id. at 445, 634 A.2d at 506 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But, the justice expounded, such a commitment of power to another branch does
not end the inquiry into whether an issue is a non-justiciable political question. Id. Justice Handler asserted that the court needs to
further examine "whether in committing the power to confirm gubernatorial nominations to the Senate, the constitutional text contains 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving [the question]."' Id. at 445-46, 634 A.2d at 506 (quoting
Baker, 369 U.S. at 216) (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
To summarize, Justice Handler articulated two questions the
court should ask when addressing the issue of justiciability. Id. at
447, 634 A.2d at 507. (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). First, the justice instructed that the court should consider
whether the subject-matter at issue has been textually committed to
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another branch of government; and second, the court should examine whether a standard governing the subject-matter can be
found in the constitutional text. Id. at 447-48, 634 A.2d at 507
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Applying
these considerations, the justice turned toward analyzing the language of the Advice and Consent Clause. Id. at 448, 634 A.2d at
507 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Constitutional interpretation, Justice Handler instructed, involves an unconstrained and sensible reading of the relevant language. Id. The words being analyzed, the justice continued,
should be given their plain meaning as derived from their ordinary
usage and understanding based on common experience. Id.
Justice Handler found that the key term of the Advice and
Consent Clause was the word "Senate." Id. According to the justice, "Senate" ordinarily means a "multi-member legislative body
that acts collectively to exercise its constitutional powers and perform its allotted governmental functions." Id. Thus, the justice explained, the constitution requires the Senate to act as a collective
body when exercising its power to confirm gubernatorial nominations. Id. at 449-50, 634 A.2d at 508 (Handler, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Justice Handler stated that Senate action
on a nomination without collective action has no validity. Id. at
450, 634 A.2d at 508 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Consequently, the justice concluded, the Senate must act as
a body when taking final action on a judicial nomination. Id. at
454, 634 A.2d at 510 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
Justice Handler asserted that the Senate's rejection of Senator
Lesniak's proposed resolution constituted final collective action on
Judge Murphy's nomination. Id. at 456, 634 A.2d at 511 (Handler,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The justice reasoned
that the Senate knew its rejection of the resolution would defeat
Judge Murphy's nomination. Id. at 460, 634 A.2d at 513 (Handler,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Moreover, the justice
noted, the rejection constituted final action because no further
steps by the Senate were required to end consideration of the nomination. Id.
In finding that rejection of a nomination on a procedural device constituted final collective action, Justice Handler proffered
that the constitution does not state whether the Senate must consider the merits of the nomination or provide reasons for its action.
Id. The Senate, the justice indicated, is only limited in its collective
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action in that it may not act in a discriminatory manner when considering a gubernatorial nomination. Id. at 461, 634 A.2d at 513
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Pollock's position that senatorial courtesy is a non-justiciable political question is easier to defend than Justice Handler's
contortionist definition of the word "Senate." As both justices
agree, the New Jersey Constitution specifically provides the Senate
with confirmation power over gubernatorial judicial nominations.
But, as Justice Pollock correctly points out, no manageable standard can be found to define either "advice and consent" or "Senate." Accordingly, it was proper for Justice Pollock to reason that
the court had no right to review the Senate's policy decision to
allow the use of senatorial courtesy.
Justice Pollock's reasoning, however, is not without flaws. The
justice does suggest that at some point the court could review Senate action if the fundamental rights of a nominee were violated.
But, other than providing an extreme example of a nomination
decided by a coin toss, the justice does not provide any guidelines
delineating at what point the court could review Senate action. Besides, in most instances, it may be factually difficult to determine
that the Senate has acted in such an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner. In the end, underJustice Pollock's reasoning, the court's
ability to review Senate action with regard to confirmations is practically meaningless. It appears that the Senate may still reject nominees, for whatever reason, with near absolute impunity.
Justice Handler's definition of "Senate" is unpersuasive. In
supposedly defining the word according to its ordinary usage, the
justice requires that the Senate act in a collective manner to validate its actions. It is not so clear, however, that collective action is
required when the Senate acts. For example, legislation introduced pursuant to the Senate's constitutional power to pass law is
routinely rejected in committee without ever being considered by
the entire Senate. Justice Handler's rationale would require the
Senate collectively to reject a bill before it could be pronounced
dead.
Additionally, if collective action is required, Justice Handler
neglects the fact that the Senate did act collectively in allowing the
use of senatorial courtesy. Senatorial courtesy is not merely a procedure which allows a single senator to act in a vacuum insulated
from the rest of the Senate. Rather, the entire Senate has approved its use and could, if it so chose, eliminate the procedure
through collective action. In light of the Senate's constitutional
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power to approve judicial nominations, it is not for the courts to
second guess the Senate's policy decision in permitting senatorial
courtesy's use in the confirmation process.
Still, potential nominees and the general public are not wholly
deprived of relief. The proper remedy lies with the electorate's
ability to vote a senator from office if it disagrees with that senator's
use of the courtesy privilege. This threat provides a check against a
senator's unfettered use of the procedure. Indeed, Senator Dorsey, who blocked Judge Murphy's nomination, was defeated in his
re-election bid in November 1993. While this remedy does not seat
a nominee who has been denied a judicial appointment, it will
force a senator to consider the possible consequences of his or her
action prior to invoking senatorial courtesy. The senator may then
conclude that the political fallout from utilizing the procedure is
not worth vetoing a gubernatorial nomination, especially one with
broad popular support.
Bruce S. Goodman

PUBLIC

RECORDS-STATE AGENCY MINUTES-AUDIO RECORDINGS

OF A STATE

AGENCY'S EXECUTIVE SESSIONS THAT ARE USED BY

THE AGENCY AS AN AID IN DRAFTING OFFICIAL WRITTEN MINUTES
OF THE SESSION CONSTITUTE A COMMON LAW RECORD AND ARE

DISCLOSuRE-Atlantic City Convention Center Auth. v. South Jersey Publishing Co., Inc., 135 N.J.
53, 637 A.2d 1261 (1994).
SUBJECT TO BALANCED PUBLIC

In 1988, Ted Bergman either resigned or was fired from his
position as the chief officer of the Atlantic City Visitors Bureau (the
Bureau). Id. at 57-58, 637 A.2d at 1263. Immediately prior to Bergman's departure from the Bureau, the state agency responsible for
operating both the Bureau and the Atlantic City Convention
Center, the Atlantic City Convention Center Authority (the Authority), conducted an executive session to address Mr. Bergman's
personnel performance. Id. at 58, 637 A.2d at 1263. Details of that
session were never made public. In 1991, the Authority created a
new administrative position charged with the responsibility of attracting convention business to non-casino hotels in the Atlantic
City area. After discussing the matter in another executive session,
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the Authority rehired Bergman as an independent contractor to
fill the new position. Both 1988 and 1991 executive sessions had
been audiotaped by the Authority to provide assistance in drafting
written minutes of the session. Investigating the circumstances behind Bergman's 1988 exit from the Bureau and the Authority's
subsequent decision in 1991 to rehire him, the South Jersey Publishing Company (the Press) requested the Authority to release the
written minutes of the 1988 and 1991 executive sessions. The Authority refused the Press's request after Bergman expressed his unwillingness to have the minutes made public.
The Authority, recognizing that the Press might have a right to
the 1988 and 1991 executive session minutes, but also recognizing
Bergman's right to privacy, began a proceeding in the chancery
division seeking direction from the court as to whether disclosure
of the minutes was mandated under the standards of South Jersey
Publishing Co. v. New Jersey Expressway Authority. Id. (citing South
Jersey PublishingCo. v. New Jersey Expressway Authority, 124 N.J. 478,
591 A.2d 921 (1991)). The chancery division reviewed the minutes
from both executive sessions searching for confidential or privileged information and ordered the Authority to release only those
portions of the minutes that concerned Bergman's 1988 exit from
the Bureau and the Bureau's 1991 decision to rehire him. Id.
During this period of review, the Press filed its own motion for
disclosure of the executive session minutes, followed by another
request that the chancery division order the Authority to release
the audiotapes of its executive sessions. Id. The Authority opposed
the release of the tapes and the chancery court subsequently refused to grant the Press's request. Id. at 59, 637 A.2d at 1263. The
chancery court ruled that the tape recordings did not constitute
publicly disclosable records and, alternatively, that the Press's interest in the audiotapes was outweighed both by Bergman's interest in
privacy as well as by the Authority's interest in maintaining the integrity of the executive session procedure. Id.
In an unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, affirmed the lower court, holding that the audiotapes of the executive session constituted neither a common law
public record nor a public record subject to New Jersey's Right-toKnow Law. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-2). The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether the
tapes constituted a public record that should have been disclosed
to the Press. Id., 637 A.2d at 1264. (citation omitted).
Reversing the lower court's ruling, the state supreme court
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held that the Authority's executive session audiotapes comprised a
common law public record and, therefore, were qualitatively subject to public disclosure. Id. at 65, 637 A.2d at 1267. Specifically,
the supreme court ruled that the tapes were subject to an in camera review by a trial court to redact privileged information as well
as to balance the public's interest in disclosure of the information
against the privacy interests of the parties involved in the dispute.
Id. at 67, 637 A.2d at 1268.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Hern outlined three
approaches that may be taken byan individual or entity seeking
access to public records. Id. at 59, 635 A.2d at 1264. First, Justice
O'Hern reasoned that an individual may assert a common law right
as a citizen to view public records. Id. Second, the justice opined
that an individual may plead a statutory right to view public documents, pursuant to the state's Right-to-Know-Law. Id. (citing N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1, et seq.). Third, Justice O'Hern noted that a
litigant may secure the information by invoking discovery procedures. Id.
The court approached the case by exploring the first two approaches to gaining access to public records. Id. at.59-60, 637 A.2d
at 1264. The court noted that at common law, a citizen must establish a "'personal' or 'particular' interest" in acquiring the desired
information. Id. at 59, 637 A.2d at 1264. Justice O'Hern further
determined that the state's Right-to-Know-Law was adopted without
this common law requirement in order to facilitate acquisition of
government documents. Id. at 59-60, 637 A.2d at 1264. Justice
O'Hern found, however, that whereas the common law defines a
public record as a writing made by a public official that is authorized by law, the Right-to-Know-Law applies only to "those records
'required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file."' Id. at 60,
637 A.2d at 1264 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-2 (West 1994)
and citing Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222, 386 A.2d 846, 851
(1978)). Therefore, the court elucidated, although the common
law limits the class of individuals who may gain access to public
documents, the common law's definition of a public record embraces a broader scope of public records than the definition of a
public record contained in the Right-to-Know-Law. Id.
Continuing its analysis of common law public records, the
supreme court declared that a common law right to view a public
record is not absolute. Id. Rather, the court proceeded, once an
individual has established an interest in and need for the desired
public material, the court will conduct a balancing test to weigh the
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relative interests of the parties and materials involved. Id. (citing
McClain v. College Hospita4 99 N.J. 346, 361, 492 A.2d 991 (1985)).
One factor to be considered in the balancing test, the court
opined, is whether disclosure of public records would hinder the
candid and deliberative process of policy and decision-making. Id.
at 62, 637 A.2d at 1265. Finally, Justice O'Hern announced that
once the basis for disclosing a personnel matter in a public record
is established, an in camera review should be conducted to excise
private information about the individual. Id.
After outlining the requirements for accessing public records
both under the Right-to-Know-Law and under the common law,
the court next analyzed whether the audiotapes constituted a public record under the Right-to-Know-Law. Id. at 63, 637 A.2d at
1266. The court recognized that the Open Public Meetings Act
requires State agencies to keep minutes of executive sessions for
public disclosure. Id. The court also noted, however, that the Authority was under no obligation to audiotape its executive sessions,
and that the audiotapes did not constitute the Authority's official
minutes. Id. at 64, 637 A.2d at 1266. Rather,Justice O'Hern found
that the Authority's decision to audiotape its meetings was made
only to provide assistance in drafting official written minutes. Id. at
63, 637 A.2d at 1266. The court reasoned that if the audiotapes
had been used by the Authority as the Authority's official minutes,
the tapes would be discoverable under the Right-to-Know-Law. Id.
Justice O'Hern concluded, however, that because the audiotapes
did not constitute the Authority's official minutes, the tapes could
not constitute a public record under the Right-to-Know-Law and,
therefore, were not available under that Act. Id. at 64, 637 A.2d at
1266.
Concluding that the audiotapes were not subject to statutory
disclosure, the court continued its analysis by determining whether
the audiotapes could be classified as public records under the common law. Id. Justice O'Hern recognized that although the common law definition of public record referred to a writing
memorialized on paper, the definition is adaptable to change by
the very nature of the common law. Id. Therefore, drawing from
several sources, such as New Jersey Rule of Evidence 801 (e), the
court discerned that the writings referred to in the common law
definition of public records could also be interpreted to include
audio recordings. Id.
Having determined that the Authority's audio recordings of its
meetings constituted common law public records, the court pos-
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ited that a balancing test was appropriate to determine what information could be accessed by the Press. Id. at 66-67, 637 A.2d at
1267-68. Defining the parameters of the balancing test, the court
recognized that the public's interest in the information contained
in the Authority's audiotapes must be weighed against an individual's right to personal privacy as well as the agency's deliberative
process privilege. Id. Furthermore, drawing from its holding in
South Jersey Publishing,the supreme court ruled that before disclosure the chancery division must conduct an in camera review of the
Authority's audiotapes in order to excise those portions that contain privileged or confidential information. Id. at 67, 637 A.2d at
1268.
The court added four additional observations to be used by
the trial court in determining whether to release information contained in the Authority's tapes. Id. at 67-69, 637 A.2d at 1268-69.
First, the court observed, the trial court must ensure that the release of information would not cause members of the Authority to
refrain from expressing themselves fully and frankly during the executive sessions out of fear that their comments would be made
public. Id. at 67-68, 637 A.2d at 1268. Second, Justice O'Hern posited, if issues of fact become disputed, the release of the tapes
achieves even greater importance to the public because they are an
indisputable record of the meetings. Id. at 68, 637 A.2d at 1268.
Third, Justice O'Hern recognized the great burden placed upon
the trial court to review hours of tapes and offered two alternative
methods that a trial court might employ to avoid this burden. Id.
First, the court suggested, the trial court could order the Authority
itself to prepare an index and summary of the contents of the
tapes. Id. Second, the court counseled, subject to the expense involved, the trial court could appoint a special master to review and
index the tapes and inform the court of any discrepancies between
the tapes and the Authority's official minutes. Id. In this manner,
the justice noted, if the master reported that the official minutes
and the tapes were not at variance with each other, the court could
find that no reason exists for the release of the tapes. Id.
As its fourth and final observation, the court recognized that
the Press could only access those material portions of the tapes that
were not fully disclosed in the Authority's official minutes. Id. at
69, 637 A.2d at 1268-69. The court cautioned, moreover, that the
trial court would be free to redact those portions of the tapes that
the trial judge found to be confidential, privileged, or that would,
if released, amount to an invasion of privacy, or unnecessarily in-
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trude on the Authority's deliberative process. Id., 637 A.2d at 1269.
The NewJersey Supreme Court thus reversed the appellate division
and remanded the case to the chancery division to determine what,
if any, portions of the Authority's audiotapes ought to be made
available to the Press. Id. at 70, 637 A.2d at 1269.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding strikes a blow to
those state agencies that have attempted to establish private
fiefdoms of their areas of responsibility by avoiding public disclosure of their activities. At the same time, the court's decision demonstrates a high degree of sensitivity to the privacy interests of the
individuals or entities that are the subject of an agency's executive
sessions as well as the privacy interests of the individual agency
members who must be free to voice their concerns in a candid and
independent discussion. Although public disclosure is an essential
aspect of a democratic society and is properly protected by the
court's decision, the court's promulgation of a balancing test
avoids the unnecessary publication of potentially embarrassing or
even damaging information.
The supreme court's use of the common law to resolve the
conflicting interests involved in this case also represents an unusual
victory for an equitable approach to the law. In an era that has
seen the marked escalation of an inflexible statutory approach to
jurisprudence, it is refreshing to see that the common law still
maintains validity in the face of legislative action that increasingly
limits the use of judicial discretion in deciding cases. Thus, the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision should be applauded not
only for its equitable conclusion, but also for the court's decision
to employ the common law in reaching its result.
David P. Kalm
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CRIMINAL LAW-STOP AND FRISK-POLICE OFFICERS ARE ENTITLED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF A SUSPECT'S

ARREST

RECORD

WHEN

DETERMINING

WHETHER

TO

SUBJECT AN INDIVIDUAL TO A PROTECTIVE FRISK FOR WEAPONS

DURING A LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATORY STOP-State v.

Valentine,

134 N.J. 536, 636 A.2d 505 (1994).
While on routine patrol during the early morning hours of
June 22, 1990, Officer Nuccio of the Red Bank Police Department
noticed defendant Ronald Valentine lurking behind a tree in an
area well-known for its high crime rate. 134 N.J. at 539, 636 A.2d at
506. His suspicions aroused, Officer Nuccio exited his marked patrol car and approached Valentine, who by then had sauntered out
from behind the tree with both hands in his pockets. Id. at 540,
636 A.2d at 506. Although it was dark, Officer Nuccio recognized
Valentine from prior encounters and recalled that he had a substantial arrest record for weapons and narcotics offenses. Id., 636
A.2d at 507.
Officer Nuccio then ordered Valentine to take his hands out
of his pockets and questioned Valentine as to his furtive actions.
Valentine complied with Officer Nuccio's request, but was evasive
in response to the officer's questions. These unconvincing answers, coupled with Valentine's overall nervous demeanor, further
aroused Officer Nuccio's suspicions. Accordingly, after radioing
for backup, Nuccio conducted a pat-down search of Valentine.
Feeling a hard object in Valentine's right jacket pocket, Officer
Nuccio reached in and removed a blade knife which was locked in
the open position. Valentine was arrested and subsequently indicted for possession of a knife by an individual previously convicted of a crime, a violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-7. Id. at
539, 540, 636 A.2d at 506, 507.
At trial, Valentine moved to suppress the knife, contending
that it was discovered during an illegal search and seizure. Id. at
539, 636 A.2d at 506. Denying Valentine's motion, the trial court
ruled that both the initial stop and the subsequent frisk of Valentine were constitutional. Id. Consequently, Valentine pleaded
guilty. Id.
On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
in an unpublished opinion, reversed Valentine's conviction. Id. at
539, 541, 636 A.2d at 506, 507 (citing State v. Valentine, 269 N.J.
Super. 508, 636 A.2d 69 (1993)). Although the panel unanimously
agreed that the investigatory stop survived constitutional muster, a
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majority of the court held that the subsequent pat-down was unconstitutional. Id. Pointing out that Officer Nuccio did not suspect Valentine of any specific criminal activity, that Valentine had
followed Nuccio's orders, and that Valentine had not behaved in
an aggressive or antagonistic manner, the appellate court concluded that it was unreasonable for the officer to believe that Valentine was armed and dangerous. Id. at 541, 636 A.2d at 507.
Moreover, the court was unwilling to countenance police officers
to rely upon personal knowledge of an individual's criminal record
as justification for a pat-down. Id. The State subsequently appealed as of right to the NewJersey Supreme Court. Id. at 539, 636
A.2d at 506.
Reversing, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a police
officer may take into account the totality of the circumstances, including knowledge of a suspect's prior criminal history, when determining whether to subject an individual to a protective patdown frisk. Id. at 550, 553-54, 636 A.2d at 512, 513-14. Noting that
Officer Nuccio had numerous factors on which to base his reasonable belief that Valentine was armed and dangerous, the supreme
court reinstated Valentine's conviction. Id., 636 A.2d at 514.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, began the court's
analysis by outlining the standards governing "stop and frisk" as set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case
Teny v. Ohio. Id. at 541-45, 636 A.2d at 507-09 (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The justice set forth the three-pronged test
established by the Terry Court for determining the constitutionality
of a search of an individual and a subsequent seizure of contraband. Id. at 542, 636 A.2d at 507 (citation omitted). Under Terry,
Justice Garibaldi instructed, a police officer must first have had justification for initially detaining the subject, then must have had
grounds for frisking the individual, and finally, must limit the
scope of the search. Id. (citation omitted).
The first prong of the Terry analysis, the justice elaborated, requires a court to consider the "totality of the circumstances" when
determining whether a police officer had the requisite level of suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop. Id., 636 A.2d at 508
(quotations omitted). Mindful that the appellate division concluded unanimously that Officer Nuccio's detention of Valentine
was constitutional, the supreme court focused on whether Nuccio's
decision to frisk Valentine incident to the investigatory stop was
permissible under Terry. Id.
In assessing whether Officer Nuccio's frisk satisfied Terry's sec-
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ond component, the court acknowledged that it had to determine
whether a "reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Id. at 543, 636 A.2d at 508 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
This standard, maintained the majority, allowed for due weight to
be given to the "specific reasonable inferences" which an officer
may derive from the particular facts of the situation based on his
personal experience. Id. (quotation omitted). Observing that the
Terry Court drafted an objective standard, the justice nonetheless
recognized that reasonableness should be measured against the
specific circumstances faced by the police officer. Id. (citation
omitted). Moreover, remarked Justice Garibaldi, Terry and its
progeny required that the evidence surrounding an officer's justification for a frisk be evaluated in terms as understood by law enforcement experts, rather than by scholarly analysts. Id. at 544, 636
A.2d at 509 (citation omitted).
With these guidelines in mind, the court addressed the circumstances under which a pat-down would be permissible. Id.
The supreme court reiterated that Terry does not authorize frisks
based merely on an officer's suspicion that criminal activity is or
was afoot. Id. Rather, reminded the court, the inquiry into
whether a protective weapons search is permissible is entirely separate from the question of whether the stop itself wasjustified. Id. at
542, 636 A.2d at 508 (citation omitted).
Noting that the Terry decision established an exception to the
usual requirement that the police base their actions on probable
cause, Justice Garibaldi nevertheless cautioned that the deviation
from the norm was narrowly drawn. Id. at 544, 636 A.2d at 509.
Accordingly, the court averred that Terry prohibited not only a generalized "cursory search for weapons," but also a search for anything other than weapons. Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover,
although Terry concerned an officer's right to stop and frisk for
weapons based on a belief that a "crime of violence" was about to
occur, the supreme court recognized that police have the same
right absent this belief if they can point to specific and articulable
facts which justify a suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous. Id. at 544, 545, 636 A.2d at 509 (citation omitted).
Although aware that an officer's right to frisk a suspect is often
automatic in light of the circumstances presented, the court was
more concerned with addressing an officer's right to frisk when
presented with less well defined circumstances. Id. at 545, 636 A.2d
at 509 (citations omitted). Emphasizing the inherent danger that
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law enforcement officers face when making instantaneous decisions regarding whether or not to frisk a suspect for weapons, the
justice warned that "courts should not set the test of sufficient suspicion that the individual is 'armed and presently dangerous' too
high when protection of the investigating officer is at stake." Id.
(quotation omitted).
Therefore, recognizing that violence has become more prevalent in society, the majority affirmed that the reasonableness of a
pat-down must be evaluated by balancing law enforcement objectives against an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unwarranted search and seizure. Id. at 546, 636 A.2d at 510
(citation omitted). In so balancing these competing interests, the
supreme court explained that reviewing courts should assess once
again the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citation omitted). Acknowledging that there were no bright line rules to assist in this
determination because each case must be decided on its facts, the
court nevertheless maintained that prior cases provided guidelines
to aid in the determination of whether Officer Nuccio's frisk of
Valentine was reasonable. Id. (citation omitted).
For example, the supreme court declared that a suspect's weak
alibi can reasonably raise an officer's suspicion that a suspect is
armed and dangerous. Id. (citations omitted). The majority further stated that although a stop in an area of high crime activity
does not in itself justify a lawful frisk, the location in which an investigatory stop occurs may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
the detainee is armed. Id. at 547, 636 A.2d at 510 (citations omitted). Similarly, the justice acknowledged that although insufficient
by itself to justify a lawful frisk, a stop made late at night can justifiably heighten an officer's reasonable belief that the individual is
armed. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the court posited that precedent supported taking into account a police officer's personal
knowledge of a detainee's criminal record when determining the
reasonableness of a pat-down. Id. at 547-51, 636 A.2d at 510-12.
Justice Garibaldi recognized, however, that a police officer's
familiarity with a suspect's criminal history cannot be the sole basis
on which the decision to frisk a suspect is grounded. Id. at 547, 636
A.2d at 510-11. Distinguishing the case at bar from the two cases
on which the appellate division placed great reliance, the supreme
court noted that Officer Nuccio's decision to frisk Valentine was
based on more than just his personal knowledge that Valentine
had been armed on previous occasions. Id. at 548-49, 636 A.2d at
511 (citations omitted).
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The court pointed out that in United States v. Hairston, a case
upon which the appellate court relied, the police officer merely
had knowledge that the suspect was a convicted felon. Id. at 549,
636 A.2d at 511 (citation omitted). The record in Hairston,
stressed the court, never implied that the frisking officer knew that
Hairston had carried weapons on previous occasions. Id. (citation
omitted). Moreover, noted the majority, the appellate division's
reliance on a second case, State v. Gitner, was similarly misplaced.
Id. at 548, 636 A.2d at 511 (citing State v. Gitner, 537 P.2d 14 (Haw.
1975)). Justice Garibaldi explained that not only had the police
officer in Gitner based his decision to frisk solely on the fact that the
suspect had been armed during a previous encounter, but also that
the officer had no basis for even initially stopping the defendant.
Id. at 549, 636 A.2d at 511-12 (quoting Gitner,537 P.2d at 17) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the court went on to briskly distinguish the facts
present in Valentine from two recent New Jersey cases where the
court held frisks to be unconstitutional. Id. at 552-53, 636 A.2d at
513 (citing State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 542 A.2d 912 (1988); State
v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 573 A.2d 1376 (1990)). Thejustice reiterated
that the constitutionality of a frisk is dependent upon the specific
facts of each case. Id. at 551, 636 A.2d at 512. The circumstances
surrounding Valentine's frisk, the majority posited, clearly demonstrated that Officer Nuccio's actions were reasonable. Id. at 553,
636 A.2d at 513-14.
The majority elaborated that factors such as Valentine's nervous behavior and evasive answers, his decision to hide behind a
tree, the high crime activity known to occur in the location of the
stop, the lateness of the hour, and Officer Nuccio's awareness of
Valentine's criminal record, including weapons offenses, all justifiably influenced Officer Nuccio's reasonable belief that Valentine
was armed and dangerous. Id. at 553-54, 636 A.2d at 514.
Although the supreme court recognized that NewJersey's Constitution might afford defendants even greater protection from unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution,
the court nonetheless concluded that the state constitution did not
compel the application of any higher standard than the Fourth
Amendment to permit a frisk arising from a lawful investigatory
stop. Id. at 543, 636 A.2d at 508 (citations omitted). Consequently,
the majority concluded that the totality of the circumstances, including knowledge of Valentine's arrest record, warranted Officer
Nuccio's frisk of Valentine during a legitimate investigatory stop.
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Id. at 553-54, 636 A.2d at 513-14. Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the appellate division's judgment and reinstated Valentine's conviction. Id. at 554, 636 A.2d at 514.
In a terse dissent, Justice Clifford voiced doubt as to the sincerity of the majority opinion. Id. at 554, 636 A.2d at 514 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). Questioning whether the court would have heard the
case if it had arisen on petition for certification, Justice Clifford
characterized the case as one that did little more than test the
court's ingenuity in coaxing from the sparse record a subtle range
of actions and speech according to which evidence is either suppressed or admitted. Id. Proclaiming that the appellate division's
reasoning more aptly applied underlying legal principles to the
facts, Justice Clifford declared that he would have affirmed the dismissal of Valentine's conviction. Id.
In a society where weapons and violence appear with ever increasing frequency, it would be patently unreasonable to require
that law enforcement officers blind themselves to the reality of the
situation when determining whether to frisk a suspect incident to a
lawful investigatory stop. As the majority so aptly noted, criminals
have "a long tradition" in this country of maiming and killing police officers with knives and guns. Id at 542-43, 636 A.2d at 508
(quotation omitted).
In addition, today's criminals often have the upper hand in
terms of weapons and ammunition. Some people feel, nevertheless, that individual rights should always be championed over the
rights of the state. It would be foolish to hold, however, that a
criminal's right to be free from searches and seizures similarly
trumps an officer's right to minimalize the risks in performance of
his duties. What should be kept firmly in mind is that when police
officers join the force, they do not and should not surrender the
right to think instinctively and act in a self preserving manner.
The New Jersey Supreme Court clearly mandates that only
"reasonable" searches and seizures will be held valid. When assessed as a whole, the facts available to Officer Nuccio at the time
of his pat-down clearly indicate that his belief was reasonable, and
in no way violated constitutional parameters.
Sarah Obaditch Kambour
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PROTEC-

PROHIBITING CIGARETTE VEND-

ING MACHINES CONSTITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF MUNICIPAL

AUTHORITY-C.I.C. Corporationv. Township of East
Brunswick, 266 N.J. Super. 1, 628 A.2d 753 (App. Div. 1993).
LEGISLATIVE

In July of 1990, the East Brunswick Township Council (Council) enacted Ordinance 90-36 to combat the problem of underage
smoking in East Brunswick, New Jersey. 266 N.J. Super. at 3-4, 628
A.2d at 754. The ordinance outlawed cigarette vending machines
in the township and imposed a fine of $250.00 for any violations.
Id. at 4, 628 A.2d at 754. Prior to enacting the ordinance, the
Council considered information from a myriad of sources, both
supporting and opposing the ban. Id. at 4-5, 627 A.2d at 755.
Groups favoring the ban presented the Council with information
indicating that cigarette vending machines, which allow unrestricted access to tobacco products, were a significant source of
cigarettes for underage smokers. Proponents of the ban also advised the Council that teen-age smoking was a "gateway" to further
drug use. Id. at 5, 627 A.2d at 755. Parties opposing the ban, however, urged the Council to consider alternatives such as the use of
remote control mechanisms which require proprietors to unlock
the machines for each sale. Additionally, the opponents suggested
restricting the machines to bars and other areas not generally accessible to minors. Ultimately, the Council concluded that a total
ban on cigarette vending machines was necessary to protect the
health of minors in East Brunswick. Id. at 6, 628 A.2d at 755.
Four cigarette vendors-C.I.C. Corporation, Coast Cigarette
Sales, Inc., Eskin Vending Corporation, and Amusement Music
Operators Association-filed suit in the NewJersey Superior Court,
Law Division, to challenge the legality of the municipal ordinance.
Id. at 3, 628 A.2d at 754. The vendors attacked the ordinance on
two grounds. First, the vendors claimed that the ordinance was
preempted by two state statutes that already regulated cigarette
sales. Id. at 6, 628 A.2d at 756. Second, the vendors asserted that
the ordinance violated equal protection by drawing an arbitrary
and unreasonable distinction between the sale of cigarettes from
vending machines and over-the-counter cigarette sales. Id. at 1213, 628 A.2d at 759.
The trial court determined that the ordinance was preempted
by two state statutes; the Cigarette Tax Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:40A-1 to -45, and the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act, N.J. STAT.
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§ 56:7-18 to -38. Id. at 6, 628 A.2d at 756. The court opined
that these statutes evinced a statewide scheme to encourage cigarette sales for the purpose of generating tax revenue. Id. However,
the trial court rejected the vendor's equal protection claim by determining that the ban was rationally related to a legitimate public
purpose and that the vendors failed to constitute a suspect or semisuspect class. Id. at 12-14, 628 A.2d at 759-60.
On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
reversed the trial court's decision and determined that the municipal ordinance was neither preempted by state law nor violative of
equal protection. Id. at 4, 628 A.2d at 754. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification and in a per curium opinion
affirmed the decision for the reasons expressed by the appellate
division.
Judge Conley, writing for the unanimous three judge panel,
first considered the vendor's preemption claim. 266 N.J. Super. at
6, 628 A.2d at 755. Judge Conley explained that preemption was a
judicially-created doctrine grounded upon the notion that a municipality could not act in contravention of the state. Id. at 7, 628
A.2d at 756 (citing Mack Paramus Co. v. Mayor of the Borough of Paramus, 103 N.J. 564, 573, 511 A.2d 1179 (1986)). Application of
the preemption doctrine, the court stressed, depended upon
whether the state legislature intended to prevent local governments from exercising police power. Id. (citing Mack, 103 N.J. at
573, 511 A.2d at 1179). The court outlined several factors that
must be considered in determining whether preemption applied,
including: whether the local ordinance conflicted with state law in
either underlying policy or operational effect; whether the state
statute was intended, either expressly or by implication, to be exclusive in the area; whether the subject matter exhibited a need for
uniformity; whether the state scheme was so broad as to preclude
coexisting municipal regulation; and whether the local ordinance
acted as an obstacle to the furtherance of the objectives and purposes of the legislature. Id. (citing Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v.
Rent Control Bd., 71 N.J. 451, 461-62, 366 A.2d 321 (1976)).
After analyzing the vendor's preemption claim in accordance
with the multi-factored approach, the appellate court concluded
that the state statutes did not preempt the East Brunswick ordinance. Id. at 12, 628 A.2d at 759. Upon reviewing the two statutes,
Judge Conley declared that the Cigarette Tax Act and the Unfair
Cigarette Sales Act were not an expression of complete or exclusive
regulation of the use of cigarette vending machines. Id. at 9, 628
ANN.
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A.2d at 757. Furthermore, the court clarified that the legislative
intent of the statutes was to regulate the sale of cigarettes in the
state. Id. at 10-11, 628 A.2d at 758. The court explained that the
statutes focused on cigarette sellers in creating a broad licensing
and taxing scheme for cigarettes, whereas the East Brunswick ordinance focused instead on underage buyers of cigarettes. Id. at 11,
628 A.2d at 758. Therefore, the court opined, the state statutes
were not an attempt to preempt the field because the purposes of
the statutes were entirely different. Id.
The appellate court next addressed the speculation that the
ban would result in lost tax revenue. Id. Judge Conley observed
that people who desired to purchase cigarettes and who were not
precluded from doing so on account of their age would continue
to buy their cigarettes over-the-counter. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the state would unlikely suffer any loss in tax revenue
as a result of the ban. Id.
Finally, the court considered a recent unsuccessful attempt by
the New Jersey Legislature to enact Assembly Bill No. 4868. Id.
The court explained that the proposed bill would have outlawed
unattended vending machines and mandated remote control locking mechanisms on machines in other areas. Id. at 11-12, 628 A.2d
at 758. Judge Conley observed that Governor Florio pocket-vetoed
the Bill and that the Governor had professed that municipalities
should be free to enact stricter laws concerning cigarette vending
machines without undue interference from the state. Id. at 12, 628
A.2d at 759. Judge Conley characterized the bill as a clear attempt
at preemption and viewed the legislature's failure to adopt the bill
as an indication that the area had not yet been preempted by the
state. Id.
Judge Conley, returning to the preemption issue, concluded
that there were no existing state statutes that evinced a clear intent
by legislature to exclusively regulate the field. Id. Accordingly, the
court declared that East Brunswick Ordinance 90-36 was not preempted by any state statutes and the ban was a valid attempt by East
Brunswick to regulate a matter of local concern. Id.
After resolving the preemption issue in favor of the township,
the appellate court next considered the vendor's claim that the ordinance violated equal protection by drawing an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction between the sale of cigarettes from vending
machines and over-the-counter cigarette sales. Id. at 12-13, 628
A.2d at 759. Judge Conley agreed with the trial court's conclusions
that cigarette vending did not comprise a suspect class nor a funda-
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mental right. Id. at 13, 628 A.2d at 759. Therefore, the appellate
court confirmed, the township must demonstrate only that the ban
was rationally related to some legitimate public purpose to satisfy
equal protection and substantive due process inquiries. Id. at 14,
628 A.2d at 760. Judge Conley then corroborated the trial court's
identification of two legitimate state interests: the prevention of
violating the law by selling cigarettes to underage buyers and the
protection of the health of township residents, especially minors.
Id. at 13, 628 A.2d at 759.
Lastly, in response to the vendor's assertion that the township
could have adopted less intrusive measures to satisfy its interests,
the court observed that the law mandated that the township employ a means rationally related to achieving its legitimate goals irrespective of a less restrictive alternative. Id. at 13-14, 628 A.2d at
760. Thus, the court concluded that because the township acted
rationally and pursuant to legitimate governmental concerns in
banning the cigarette machines, the court would not interfere by
insisting that the township utilize a less restrictive alternative. Id. at
15-16, 628 A.2d at 761.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, insightfully analyzed the universe of statutes governing cigarette sales
in New Jersey. The court accurately distinguished the dissimilar
purposes of similar statutes to determine that the state legislature
did not intend to preempt municipalities from regulating cigarette
vending machines. While smokers may characterize the opinion as
merely another ripple in the rising tide of anti-smoking sentiment,
the decision is simply a fair evaluation of municipal legislative authority, and the court's decision to provide municipalities with the
power to regulate an area of local concern was just and reasonable.
W Brian Stack

